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Medea’s famous words “I see the better and approve it, but I follow the worse”1 fully 
illustrates men’s paradoxical way of acting known in the ancient Greek under the name of akrasia. 
Aristotle’s  seventh  book  of  Nicomachean  Ethics  put  forward  a  subtle  philosophical  analysis  of 
akrasia or the weakness of will, which became a standard reference for further discussions on this 
issue in antiquity. Largely interpreted as one person’s acting against his or her better judgment, 
akrasia continued to be a topic of interest in the Middle Ages, where started to be translated as 
‘incontinentia’ (hence ‘incontinence’ as one of its English correspondents). However, not too 
much has been said of the history of this term in the Early Modern period. The most recent book 
of professor Risto Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, aims at filling 
this gap. Although the novelty of the study consists in the discussion of some selected thinkers of 
the Renaissance and Reformation, the book equally deals with the ancient time and some of the 
echoes Reformation had in modernity. The historical account of incontinence is based here on a 
discussion of an extended list of authors, running from Socrates to Shakespeare.  
  Thus, we find out that the problem of how one can act against one’s better judgment 
finds its first answer in that side of Plato’s thought which favors the dominance of desire or 
passion over the rational or better part of the soul. The akratic is that person who’s rationality is 
overcome by the appetitive part of the soul. A powerful desire sometimes can succeed in driving 
the action even against one’s sound judgment. Saarinen (p. 8) points out that Plato also allowed 
for a different interpretation, which further had an influence on Aristotle. As concerning the 
Stagirite, Saarinen draws on his previous study Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine 
to  Buridan2  for  providing  us  with  three  possible  interpretations  of  the  well  known  practical 
syllogism  meant  by  Aristotle  to  explain  how  rational  deliberation  works.  The  last  of  these 
interpretations is somehow favored by Saarinen here, the reason being that it makes justice to the 
emphasis put by Aristotle on the fact that the akratic has a good choice before deliberating 
between different alternatives of acting: “the propositional conclusion and the good choice are 
formed in the mind of the akratic, but for some reason they remain imperfect and therefore 
cannot prevent the emergence of the passionate act contrary to choice” (p. 12).  
  The analysis of Stoic and Christian elements and further of Augustine’s view upon the 
weakness of will uncovers a slightly different type of approaching the issue. The aim of this new 
interpretation seemed to be the provision of a middle ground between intellectual Aristotelianism 
and the overestimated role of desire in Platonism. The Stoics endowed emotions with some 
embedded  judgmental  content,  while  Augustine  stressed  the  decisive  role  of  one’s  personal 
consent to act. For Augustine, akrasia is represented by the conflict of two wills, one external and 
the  other  one,  internal.  According  to  this  view,  a  plurality  of  impulses  drive  the  internal 
tendencies of man but the external act only depends on one’s consent to one of these sensual 
impressions. Concupiscence and sin however echo a stronger Stoic influence upon Augustine and 
Saarinen  points  out that  there  are  passages  in  Augustine’s  works  which  “affirm the  view  of 
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concupiscence  as  judgment  which  in  itself  already  involves  consent.  They  break the  twofold 
sequence of desire and consent, and claim in a genuinely Stoic manner that the awareness of 
some desires already involves proper judgments and assent” (p. 24). 
  This  last  Stoic  component  of  Augustine’s  thinking  strongly  influenced  Luther’s 
interpretation  of  the  Apostle  Paul’s  letter  to  the  Romans  and  accordingly,  Luther’s  specific 
understanding  of  sin  and  concupiscence  as  inherent  to  human  nature.  Thus,  I  think  that 
Saarinen’s discussion of Augustine in chapter one could be read in parallel with his analysis of 
Luther’s approach presented in chapter three. The author provides us with a careful analysis of 
Luther’s theory of sin along several pages (see esp. pp. 119-125), which ends with an overview of 
the different currents of thought (Platonist, Aristotelian, Stoic etc) that occur in Luther’s opinion, 
the final conclusion stating the impossibility of akrasia in Luther’s thought (p. 125).  
  Saarinen’s attractive analysis however reaches its peak when dealing with the Renaissance 
period. The author selects eight important thinkers for examination: Francesco Petrarch, Donato 
Acciaiuoli,  John  Versor,  Jacques  Lefèvre  d’Étaples,  Jose  Clichtove,  Francesco  Piccolomini, 
Virgilius Wellendorffer and John Mair, the last two being systematically discussed almost for the 
first time in the literature. For example, Virgilius Wellendorffer (1460-1534) proves to be a close 
follower  of  Walter  Burley,  Albert  the  Great,  Thomas  Aquinas  and  implicitly  of  Aristotle’ 
intellectualist approach, his answer to the problem raised by incontinence being that “the akrates 
reaches the good propositional conclusion of the practical syllogism at least to some extent, but 
fails to put it into practice” (p. 71).  
  However, in comparison with Müller’s account3, Saarinen’s approach seems to be less 
interested in a wide disclosure of the philosophical subtleties of incontinence. This is not meant to 
say that conceptual analysis is lacking. On the contrary, it systematically and suitably joins the 
different historical views of akrasia listed in the book (cf. for example pp. 23-5, 80-2, 149-52, 188 
etc). However, it seemed to me that the book better performs in mapping the historical influences 
and connections between different interpretations occurring in different ages than in revealing the 
philosophical assumptions of the different theories of incontinence. This however forms one of the 
major virtues of the book, the intricate influence of ancient currents upon medieval explanations 
of incontinence or the impact of the former or of the last too upon the Reformation thought being 
unraveled with great proficiency. Moreover, every chapter and section is followed by a short 
summary of the discussion with two different schematic but suggestive overviews occurring at 
pages 42 and 217. Therefore, it becomes evident that the book fully accomplishes one of its 
major aims, namely to show that “the classical problem of weakness of will was the source of 
lively debates and significant innovations during the Renaissance and Reformation” (p. 3).  
  A bit difficult for the reader could be the evaluation of the book’s second intention, 
namely the use of akrasia as a key tool to unwrap “the general understanding of the human 
condition during the formative period between medieval times and early modernity” (p. 3). It 
seems to me a bit hard to discern the passages where this topic is directly addressed, with the 
exception perhaps of the analysis of the Reformation. The text is also very dense and this makes 
it very difficult to detach rich discussions of the human condition as an issue stemming from the 
conceptual puzzles raised by akrasia itself. My suggestion is that a graphic representation of the 
net of the theological ideas listed in the book would have helped the reader to better grasp the 
relationship of the different interpretations and of their relevance for the discussion of the human 
condition. Moreover, Bejkzy4, unreferred to by Saarinen at all, seems to be a better candidate at 
fulfilling this second major task of Saarinen’s study. 
  However, the book compensates with a detailed presentation of many original texts on 
incontinence, thus becoming attractive for the general public but first and foremost for students or 
specialists wishing to undertake a serious study of the phenomenon called weakness of the will.   
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  Finally, it remains us to ask: where can we still look back in the past for finding new 
insights into the interpretation of akrasia? Although Müller5 (2009, pp. 285-91) makes an effort to 
cover on few pages the Patristic contribution to this discussion, I think many and still interesting 
suggestions can be found in this literature. And to my knowledge, there is no better study to start 
with than Frede’s6 analysis of the originality of Saint John of Damascus’ interpretation of will and 
rational deliberation.   
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